Insight: CDC didn’t heed own lessons from 2004 anthrax scare

[riky]

Insight: CDC didn’t heed own lessons from 2004 anthrax scare

<p><a href="http://news.yahoo.com/insight-cdc-didn-t-heed-own-lessons-2004-110623750.html"><img src="http://l3.yimg.com/bt/api/res/1.2/5WiHFO927UOuiptyfzQYIQ--/YXBwaWQ9eW5ld3M7Zmk9ZmlsbDtoPTg2O3E9NzU7dz0xMzA-/http://media.zenfs.com/en_us/News/Reuters/2014-06-29T110623Z_1_LYNXMPEA5S06D_RTROPTP_2_USA-ANTHRAX.JPG" width="130" height="86" alt="A microscopic picture of spores and vegetative cells of Bacillus anthracis which causes the disease anthrax" align="left" title="A microscopic picture of spores and vegetative cells of Bacillus anthracis which causes the disease anthrax" border="0" /></a>By Julie Steenhuysen and Sharon Begley CHICAGO/NEW YORK (Reuters) - When a Maryland lab accidentally sent a batch of live anthrax to a children’s hospital in California in 2004, the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention sent a team of investigators to make sure such an error never happened again.     This month, the CDC is investigating a nearly identical anthrax mixup â€" within its own highly secure Atlanta laboratories. The question of what to do is back.     In the intervening decade, leaders in the field have found a possible answer, so far rejected by the CDC, in a new process called biorisk management. The private lab that sent the live anthrax in 2004 has broadly adopted biorisk management, and Emory University, located a mile away from the CDC in Atlanta, has become the first academic lab to adopt it. Researchers around the globe are on board.     But not the CDC.</p><br clear="all"/>

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